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UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,




It is well known to those involved in the world of employment-discrim-
ination law that in 1974 the United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corporation entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement which provided for a new on-the-job training program de-
signed solely to correct the virtually total absence of blacks in Kaiser's
craft workforce. Fifty percent of the trainees were to be black. Brian We-
ber, a white production worker who failed to obtain a position in the pro-
gram, instituted a class action suit alleging that the affirmative action plan
discriminated against him and his white colleagues in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 When the case reached the Supreme
Court, a five-to-two majority in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO-CLC v. Weber 2 upheld the affirmative action plan. Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan conceded that, under some circumstances, dis-
crimination against whites may be outlawed by Title VII, but it did not
follow that affirmative action plans fell under that prohibition. Although
the language of the statute might appear to outlaw the Kaiser plan, the
Court reminded us that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers.'3 The Court then observed that the statute had to
be "read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and
the historical context from which the Act arose. "4 The Court's approach
was a reminder for me of what one of my own law professors had
claimed, sarcastically, had become the mode for statutory interpretation:
if the legislative history is not clear, look to the words of the statute.
Having decided that the answer to the question was to be found in the
legislative history, Justice Brennan quoted many of the congressional
supporters of Title VII. The general impact of all the quotes was that
* This article was originally delivered as a speech to the Pacific Coast Labor Law Conference on
May 8, 1980.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
1. 42U.S.C. §2000e (1976).
2. 443U.S. 193 (1979).
3. Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
4. Id.
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blacks in our society had had very bad employment opportunities due to
long traditions of discrimination; this state of affairs had resulted in their
having fewer of the necessities of life than were available to members of
society in general. The Court recognized Congress had expressly made it
clear that the Act did not require racial balancing; however, Congress had
not similarly addressed the question whether racial balancing was permit-
ted. Somehow, this fortified the Court's conclusion "that Congress did
not intend to limit traditional business freedom to such a degree as to
prohibit voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action." 5
Having concluded that the affirmative action plan was lawful because
Congress had passed Title VII to help blacks get more jobs, the majority
opinion made clear that it was unlikely to approve any and all affirmative
action plans. The Kaiser plan passed muster because it had the same pur-
poses as Title VII, to wit, "to break down old patterns of racial segrega-
tion and hierarchy" and "to 'open employment opportunities for Negroes
in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.' "6 The
Court went on:
At the same time, the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
the white employees. The plan does not require the discharge of white
workers and their replacement with new black hirees. . . .Nor does the
plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of
those trained in the program will be white. Moreover, the plan is a tempo-
rary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to
eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. 7
In a very subtle and thoughtful concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun
preferred to approve the Kaiser plan on a ground the majority implicitly
rejected-that to fail to approve would place companies like Kaiser in an
impossible position. Whenever an employer has a disparate work force, it
is exposed to potentially successful litigation by blacks because they are
underrepresented. If the law does not permit the employer to extricate
itself from that situation, at least where the employer is arguably commit-
ting a violation of the Act, it means the employer may be required to
continue violating the law and having back pay accrue against it. More-
over, it hardly seems wise to leave all resolution of such problems to the
courts, and to preclude private parties from working out these matters
without governmental interference. 8 On balance, however, Blackmun
was prepared to join the majority's opinion, as well as its result, because
5. Id. at 207.
6. Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
7. Id. (citations omitted).
8. Justice Blackmun preferred approaching the problem in terms of the dilemma which employ-
ers and unions everywhere face: what to do when there are "not enough" blacks to satisfy the doctri-
Vol. 56:51, 1980
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he was not persuaded that his "arguably violative" standard would result
in different conclusions than the majority's "societal discrimination" ap-
proach. Justice Blackmun made a powerful statement supporting the idea
of private parties' remedying past discrimination, much of which might
not be remediable under Title VII. Blackmun agreed with Brennan that it
would be ironic if Title VII, passed to help black people, were to be inter-
preted to prevent private citizens from correcting abuses against blacks,
abuses the statute did not address.
Justice Rehnquist wrote one of his more colorful and vitriolic dissents.
He suggested the majority had accelerated the impendency of George
Orwell's 1984. He told us that "by a tour de force reminiscent not of
jurists such as Hale, Holmes, and Hughes, but of escape artists such as
Houdini, the Court eludes clear statutory language, 'uncontradicted' leg-
islative history, and uniform precedent in concluding that employers are,
after all, permitted to consider race in making employment decisions.' '9
As to the statutory language, Rehnquist opined:
Were Congress to act today specifically to prohibit the type of racial dis-
crimination suffered by Weber, it would be hard pressed to draft language
better tailored to the task than that found in Section 703(d) of Title VII: 'It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer . ..to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race ... in admission
to .. .any program established to provide apprenticeship or other train-
ing." 0
Justice Rehnquist also argued that the legislative history does not support
the views of the majority. Although he would have had the reader believe
that the Congress rejected the majority's interpretation of the Act, close
reading of his opinion as well as of the legislative history makes clear that
Congress had a great deal of debate about the Act's requiring propor-
tional work forces; as a result, Section 7030) was passed. In truth, the
Congress never considered the issue of voluntary affirmative action, and
in one part of his opinion, Justice Rehnquist conceded as much.
nal requirement of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)? See notes 22-28 and accompa-
nying text infra for a discussion of Griggs. Blackmun could not believe that the law precluded
someone who may be already violating the law from remedying the situation. Weber, 443 U.S. at
209-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring). My own sense of justice reaches the same conclusion. Given
what may be serious constitutional problems, as well as common fairness, in the absence of an ex-
plicit Congressional mandate prohibiting plans like Kaiser's, a court would be seriously remiss in
constrIing Title VII to outlaw Kaiser's conduct. The "arguable violation" thesis embraced by Black-
mun was not adopted by the Court's majority, however.
9. Weber, 443 U.S. at 222.
10. Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
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II. VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT
TO REMEDY THE EFFECTS OF SOCIETAL
DISCRIMINATION
A. The Language of the Act
The proper place to begin the analysis of the issue addressed by both
the majority and dissent is where Justice Rehnquist wanted-with the lan-
guage of the Act. The statute says that it is an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect
to his . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race. . . .", It is also an unlawful employment prac-
tice for the employer to "classify his employees . . . in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities . . . because of such individual's race.... ".12 Finally, the Act
also expressly outlaws racial discrimination in admission to apprentice-
ship or training programs. 13 Justice Rehnquist would have it that the
words are clear, that Congress could not have stated the matter any more
clearly, even if that august body had anticipated Brian Weber's plight and
had intended to help him out of it. It would be foolhardy, at least, to deny
that the statutory words can carry the meaning Justice Rehnquist gives
them. On balance, however, he is wrong in his claim about the clarity of
the Act, and in being wrong, has overstated the logical limitations of al-
ternative constructions of the Act. The statute does not explicitly say it
shall be unlawful to discriminate against an employee "in order to
achieve a better balance between white and black employees," or "in
order to help black employees have better opportunities to overcome their
lifetime of being victims of discrimination." I do not read anywhere in
the statute the words that say, explicitly, that it is unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate on the basis of race "in any and all circumstances,
even circumstances of which the members of Congress never dreamed-
probably-and surely about which the members never talked with one
another." In the absence of such explicit language, which would come
much closer to being the kind of clear language which Justice Rehnquist
claimed existed, it is my judgment that the statutory language upon which
he relied does not necessarily resolve-or even address-the problem
presented in Weber.
Reaching a conclusion 1800 from Justice Rehnquist's, one can make a
contrary facial argument based on section 703(j), which states: "Nothing
11. 42U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(l)(1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
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contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
. . .to grant preferential treatment to any individual . . .because of
race. . on account of an imbalance. . . in the work force." 14 If affir-
mative action plans are outlawed by the general prohibitions of the Act
upon which Justice Rehnquist relied, section 703(j) is rendered wholly
redundant; therefore, in order to give section 703(j) any meaning, it can
be argued, voluntary affirmative actionis lawful. I have difficulty with
this argument also. The legislative history reflects a Congressional alarm
that courts, upon discovering racial imbalance in work forces, would find
violations based on that fact alone and order quota-like remedies. The
Congressional concern was not that voluntary affirmative action might be
permissible, rather, that courts would interpret the general prohibitions of
the Act to require racial balance. In my view the Congress never dealt
with the matter of voluntary affirmative action. If it is true that the provi-
sion is redundant, one is a little glib, I believe, to hoist the Congress on its
own petard. Congressional redundancy is neither impossible nor unthink-
able. When we know Congress never meant, one way or the other, to deal
with a difficult question, resolution of the issue solely through nice pars-
ing of statutory words-either way-is or ought to be unthinkable.
B. The Purposes of the Act
If the language does not resolve the issue, what does? The majority
came closer than did the dissent in wrestling with the nature of the prob-
lem; the majority, at least, tried. Whether the Court came up with the
correct answer is debatable. No one doubts that Congress meant to outlaw
motivated employment discrimination based on ethnicity. The more diffi-
cult question is whether Congress also meant to outlaw some forms of
racial imbalances, whether Congress was sufficiently concerned with the
social problem caused by racial discrimination to attempt somewhat-or
a whole lot-racial balancing. Or, whether Congress meant to leave ra-
cial balancing to private ordering. Or, finally, whether Congress found all
racial balancing to be repugnant.
The answers obviously turn on-why does society desire to outlaw
employment discrimination based on race? I believe there are three rea-
sons. The first is that race is an innate quality, or characteristic, over
which an individual has no control.15 Accordingly, it is not fair or just for
society to impose burdens when the person is not responsible. The second
reason is that race appears to be wholly-or virtually-irrelevant to the
14. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1976).
15. Fiss, A Theory ofFair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 240-44 (1971).
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ability to do the job. 16 That is, although one is not responsible for being
black, we might still tolerate racial discrimination in employment if we
believed the trait was relevant to performance. Aside from other persons'
biases which might affect one's performance, we do not believe ethnicity
is relevant to one's ability to do the job.
The stated two reasons, however, are not sufficient to explain the exis-
tence or purpose of Title VII. It is not clear we would want to outlaw
racial employment discrimination, however irrational we believed it to
be, if all persons were sometimes the discriminators and sometimes the
discriminatees; if all ethnic groups had equal, statistical access to jobs; if
all ethnic groups were equally affluent, prestigious, and influential. At
least I am not sure we should want to outlaw a pluralism that allowed
random ethnic discrimination. Although, on balance, I might prefer the
"melting pot," or I might prefer some integration as well as some identi-
fiable pluralism, it is not clear to me that we, as a society, desire to de-
stroy ethnic pride, consciousness, and behavior. Destruction of that
pluralistic attitude and behavior would be difficult; quick destruction
might be possible, but only with involvement of the law.
Since my judgment, albeit not empirically provable, is that pluralism is
desired by large segments of our society and is not-in any event-a
clear, indefensible evil, there must be another reason for the legislation
called Title VII. The third reason for the passage of the Act is simply
stated: in the United States, the burden of discrimination (in employment
and elsewhere) has fallen on the members of certain ethnic groups. Racial
discrimination is not random. Most of us do not suffer the burdens and
barbs of ethnic discrimination; more importantly, whether or not we do
suffer this irrationality sometimes, most of us have been treated most of
the time by dominant persons or institutions without our race being a han-
dicap. Saying that about blacks or chicanos, for example, would be an
outright lie. These are people in our society-as a whole-who suffer in
a vastly disproportionate way because of their ethnicity. The degrees of
suffering and disparity are probably immeasurable, but few-if any-
would deny their existence.
A rational justification, then, for Title VII is that identifiable ethnic
groups in our society have suffered in a vastly disparate way and that
society, through Title VII, determined to rectify that imbalance. The his-
torical fact is, I think, that Title VII never would have been passed with-
out notice of the obvious state of affairs that black people, specifically,
were systematically prevented from participating usefully and gainfully in
our culture. The political history of the Act is consistent with my ethical
16. Id. at 244-49.
Vol. 56:51, 1980
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or moral observation that it is not necessarily racial discrimination alone
that ought to generate a response from law; what needs obliteration is
racial discrimination which oppresses one or more particular groups.
At this point, to avoid for myself all sorts of trouble, I should make
clear that I find virtually nothing usefully "rational" about discrimination
based on ethnicity, whether or not the victim is a member of an oppressed
group. I have already made it clear that ethnicity (with the possible excep-
tion of religion) is not voluntary and, absent other persons' biases, eth-
nicity is not relevant to job performance. My only point is that a pluralis-
tic society must not outlaw the exercise of all biases believed to be
irrational, or more particularly, the biases created by the pluralism itself.
On the other hand, I am not so naive as to ignore the nature of employ-
ment today. The exercise of ethnic biases by a large corporate employer,
for example, hardly ever reflects the sort of personal pluralistic impulse
about which I am talking. Moreover, employment is such an important
part of mere existence that we may well desire outlawing pluralistic bias,
even when exercised by a small individual employer who wants her own
ethnic group around her. Nevertheless, the dichotomy I suggest-there is
a difference between random, pluralistic ethnic discrimination, and socie-
tal ethnic discrimination against one, or a few, identifiable groups-is
real, important, and supportive of my position that Title VII would not
have been, and perhaps never should have been, passed without the mas-
sive oppression of black people.
In Weber's majority and concurring opinions, there was recognition of
this argument. Justice Brennan, for the majority, stated:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over cen-
turies of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had
'been excluded from the American dream for so long,' . . . constituted the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts
to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 17
Justice Blackmun wrote:
Strong considerations of equity support an interpretation of Title VII that
would permit private affirmative action to reach where Title VII itself does
not. The bargain struck in 1964 with the passage of Title VII guaranteed
equal opportunity for white and black alike, but where Title VII provides no
remedy for blacks, it should not be construed to foreclose private affirma-
tive action from supplying relief. It seems unfair for respondent Weber to
argue, as he does, that the asserted scarcity of black craftsmen in Louisiana,
the product of historic discrimination, makes Kaiser's training program ille-
gal. . . . Absent compelling evidence of legislative intent, I would not in-
17. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,204(1979).
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terpret Title VII itself as a means of 'locking in' the effects of segregation
for which Title VII provides no remedy. 18
Having argued that a purpose of the Act is consistent with voluntary
balancing of the races in the work force, I should add that one cannot
candidly argue that the statute is unambiguously committed to that objec-
tive. One's own sense of propriety regarding racially conscious employ-
ment behavior is important, indeed it is essential, in resolving the ques-
tion, which I submit is not clearly answered by the face of the Act, and is
only supported-not compelled-by the purposes of the Act. The argu-
ments that are for and against private affirmative action are well known.
In favor of such affirmative action the following can be said: 19
(1) Affirmative action may be the only way to end the cycle of dis-
crimination that so adversely affects certain minorities 20 in our society; so
long as those minorities disproportionately cannot get good education,
good jobs, or good homes, it may be necessary for society to engage in
some forms of affirmative action. Arguably, employment is the most log-
ical-or most likely-place to begin the effort. If not, it may at least be
one of the places.
(2) Affirmative action may compensate individuals who have already
suffered from past personal and societal discrimination.
(3) Affirmative action may create an incentive for the next generations
of minorities to try harder to succeed. Models of success may serve as
inspiration.
(4) Affirmative action may well prove to be the most efficient use of
some people in our society. That is, because of stereotypes (many of
which are subconscious), minorities presently have abilities which are not
used to best advantage.
(5) In the long run, it may be true that through affirmative action, we
will better train and prepare minorities, thereby utilizing talents which at
the present time go undeveloped and unused.
(6) Arguably, although very debatably, affirmative action may be nec-
essary if society is ever going to attain full employment. By qualifying
more persons for more jobs, we may well approach more closely the ideal
of full employment.
(7) By working side-by-side with minorities, whites may learn that
their stereotypical attitudes about minorities are fallacious.
18. Id. at214-15.
19. Since this paper was delivered, Judge Skelly Wright has published a strong defense of Weber
which discusses the advantages of affirmative action. See Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-
Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 231 (1980).
20. Throughout this paper, I refer only to discrimination based on ethnicity. Of course, much-
although probably not all--of the reasoning and comments may apply similarly to sex discrimination.
Vol. 56:51, 1980
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(8) By placing more minorities in better jobs, we may improve com-
munications between various segments of society, the effect of those
communications being that society as a whole may reflect the values and
interests of a broader range of the population.
(9) The alleged innocent victims of affirmative action may have shared
in the actual bigotry of society or of the employer; in any event, they are
the beneficiaries of an illegitimate heritage, and as between them and the
innocent minorities, there is much to be said in favoring the minorities.
(10) To the extent we believe motivated discriminatory employment
exists, but we cannot prove it, affirmative action catches the malfeasors in
its net.
(11) Affirmative action may involve efficient methods of proof, since
motive and pretext are such slippery matters for the trier of fact.
(12) To a considerable extent, affirmative action assuages the major-
ity's guilt. In this sense, affirmative action is a symbol of egalitarian
mores.
(13) The absence of affirmative action, which is symbolic of society's
efforts to undo a terrible heritage, may cause deep resentment among the
oppressed minorities in society and, thereby, exacerbate racial tensions.
There is also much, however, to be said against affirmative action: 21
(1) Employers will be forced to engage in inefficiencies, at least in the
short run, and possibly in the long run, by using less competent persons.
(2) Most, although not all, of the "victims" (the white employees) of
affirmative action are fairly innocent.
(3) Employing people because of their race will only reinforce in the
long run the very classifications we are attempting to eliminate.
(4) If the beneficiaries of affirmative action are not as competent to do
certain jobs as the other employed people, the stereotype of inability will
be reinforced.
(5) The beneficiaries of affirmative action are not necessarily the vic-
tims of the larger societal discrimination, and they are also unlikely to
have been the victims of the particular practices of the involved employ-
ers.
(6) To the extent that less competent persons are being used, not only
does the employer suffer from the inefficiency-so, too, does society.
There may be less money, more danger, and less quality goods and ser-
vices in general.
(7) If people know there is affirmative action being practiced, they
21. Since this paper was delivered Professor Bernard Meltzer has published a strong attack on
Weber which discusses the disadvantages of affirmative action. See Meltzer, The Weber Case: The
Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 423
(1980).
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(other than the beneficiaries) will believe to some extent that all minori-
ties are not as competent as their abilities may really be. Probably, these
people will be suspicious of all minorities in good jobs.
(8) If it is known that affirmative action is being practiced, the individ-
uals who share the preferred qualities with the beneficiaries of the pro-
gram will wonder if they obtained their jobs because they were able or
because they had the preferred qualities. Self-doubt will be unnerving, at
best, debilitating, at worst.
(9) There are minorities who are fully qualified regardless of ethnicity,
and they may affirmatively desire that their credentials' bona fides not be
compromised.
(10) Affirmative action may cause deep resentment among the whites
in society, in general, thereby exacerbating racial tensions.
(11) The elements of proving imbalance are far more complicated and
burdensome, perhaps, than chasing the elusive subjective state of mind of
the actor. Moreover, as a practical matter, a plaintiff will attempt to prove
both bad motive and disparity in the work force. Affirmative action, then,
may make litigation longer and more difficult.
(12) To the extent we are moved to affirmative action because we sus-
pect there is a lot of unprovable motivated racial discrimination, we must
recognize that affirmative action will also impose upon a number of inno-
cent employers.
(13) There is no easy way to identify which groups ought to be denomi-
nated "oppressed" and thereby qualify for the benefits of affirmative ac-
tion.
(14) There is a danger that affirmative action for one group will slip
into destructive discrimination against another minority group.
Undoubtedly, there may be other pros and cons. Nevertheless, the list
just recited is sufficiently long and complicated, the items sufficiently
non-quantifiable, that one cannot-it seems to me-be certain affirma-
tive action is either a good or a bad idea. One's own intuition as to what
will happen, and to what degree it will happen, must be determinative.
Moreover, one's own values will play a role. For example, my own intui-
tion tells me all of the pros and cons I have listed are real; their existence
will vary in strength from situation to situation. Most generally, my own
bias, if it is that" is that our society needs to persuade the next generation
of minorities that they do have a chance to succeed in this complicated
and competitive world. My sense tells me that without that belief and
consequential motivation, we shall wait even longer (perhaps, forever) to
have a society in which no class of human beings is significantly disad-
vantaged because of race. The objective of motivating fature generations
Vol. 56:51, 1980
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of minorities convinces me that, on balance, affirmative action is a legiti-
mate technique which ought to be pursued.
C. Case Law
Having reached the conclusion that the language of the Act does not
address voluntary affirmative action, having observed that the purposes
of the Act are consistent with but do not compel affirmative action, and
having listed the pros and cons about affirmative action and found the
balance not wholly conclusive, I think it is time to look at precedent.
Unfortunately, I believe we shall find that it, too, compels neither the
majority's nor the dissent's conclusion.
Most importantly, the Court had to deal with Griggs v. Duke Power22
and its progeny. In that case, you will remember, the employer (assumed
by the Supreme Court to be acting in good faith) required applicants for
all but the most menial jobs to have high school diplomas and to pass
certain so-called literacy or intelligence tests. The Court noted that a
much higher percentage of whites than blacks graduated from high school
in North Carolina, where Duke Power is, and that on a national basis,
whites did far better than blacks on the required tests. It followed that
blacks were being disproportionately disqualified from the jobs. The bur-
den, said the Court, was on the employer to explain or justify that dis-
parity. Since the employer had not done so (How could the employer
have done so? The employer did not know, until the Supreme Court said
it, that the employer had that burden.), the employer lost. In my judg-
ment, the decision is affirmative action, pure and simple. The very idea
that the Court was not chasing motivated discrimination suggests affirma-
tive action was involved. This conclusion is underscored by two observa-
tions. First, disparate impact (a fancy phrase for saying, "There are not
enough blacks around here") is nothing but a statistical game reflecting a
desire for a balanced work force. Second, there is little doubt in my mind
that the standards did have some correlation with the capacity to do well
in most jobs in our society and probably some correlation with the jobs at
Duke Power. Literacy is almost always helpful for employment. The bet-
ter an employee can read and communicate the more likely the employee
will do a good job. I am not saying that the relevance is necessarily strong
or that the standard used was the best indicator of who would be a good
employee. What I am saying, however, is that if we assume the employer
is acting in good faith, as the Griggs Court did, we must recognize the
employer's business judgment was not wholly irrational. Despite reams
22. 401 U.S.424(1971).
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of subsequent litigation and rulings and regulations, and despite consider-
able pretense that tests and standards can be quantified or made objective
and scientific, the truth is that there is a lot of discretion being exercised
in all tests and their validation, and that subjectivity is not far from the
surface. That being the case, it is not clear to me that by applying the Act
we are demonstrably improving the employer's standards for employ-
ment. Even if we were, however, the Act was not meant to improve em-
ployment standards. It was meant to outlaw racial discrimination.
If the employer in Griggs did not mean to discriminate, then it must be
that the Court is saying nothing more than Duke Power did not have
enough blacks (the fact the employer may defend does not change the
nature of that fundamental accusation). This is affirmative action. Addi-
tionally, the employer may be forced to compromise the efficiency of the
work force-to the extent the attacked standards were relevant to em-
ployment-in order to increase the number of minority workers. This,
too, is a characteristic of affirmative action. In these two senses, then,
affirmative action was an important part of the Griggs opinion. Note,
however, in holding that the tests and diploma requirements were not suf-
ficiently related to the job, the Court obfuscated what it was doing. To
that extent, some of the cons associated with affirmative action are not so
clearly a problem. That is, for example, minorities who get jobs at Duke
Power will be less likely to wonder if they are qualified. Their colleagues
at work will be less inclined to be suspicious of their competence. Never-
theless, many of the reasons for not having affirmative action are still
present in Griggs. Also, the Griggs approach suffers from a lack of can-
dor. 23 On the other hand, all the reasons for having such a program sup-
port the Griggs decision.
Since Griggs, courts have extended its reasoning to qualifications other
than tests and diplomas. In the face of disparate statistics, employment
standards based on the size of the job applicants have fallen;24 standards
based on garnishment of wages have been set aside;25 standards based on
arrest records have been set aside, 26 and even on occasion, standards
23. One may argue that the lack of candor is justified because some of the costs of affirmative
action are obfuscated or even eliminated by the slight of hand. However, to the extent the lie is
exposed, the Court's credibility is seriously undermined. Moreover, the Court may be tempted, even
unconsciously, to substitute dishonesty for reasoning more often than can be justified by anyone's
pragmatic philosophy. "Lying" is a technique, I believe, not often-if ever-legitimate for the
Court.
24. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
25. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
26. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Syss., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 472 F.2d
631 (9th Cir. 1972).
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based on conviction records as well. 27 In all of these cases, the employer
could, I believe, argue reasonably that the standards had some relevance
to the business. More important, in none of these cases was it assumed
that the employer meant to discriminate against minorities. In short,
courts are substituting their own judgment for that of employers in weigh-
ing employers' justifications against the disparity and determining
whether the former justifies the latter. This falls short of instructing all
employers always to have proportional work forces. It compromises the
desire for affirmative action and proportionality with, at least, the desire
to avoid some of the more serious risks of employing less qualified peo-
ple. 28
In addition to the Griggs progeny which I characterize as affirmative
action decisions, there was the very substantial body of cases in which the
courts, themselves, had imposed quotas on employers. 29 In most of those
cases, the employers had proven to be violators of the Act in egregious
and flagrant circumstances, and the courts despaired that the employers
could be convinced to behave themselves without a coercive order to in-
tegrate through quotas. Nevertheless, it is almost surely true that most of
the beneficiaries of those court orders were not the victims of the employ-
ers' earlier violations of the law; conversely, the white applicants who did
not get jobs because of the court imposed quotas were not the beneficiar-
ies of the earlier discrimination. Moreover, the burden of the remedy was
not placed on the law-breaking employers; the onus was placed on the
relatively innocent white, usually blue collar, workers. In many ways,
these cases were strong support for the result in Weber.30 Although there
is a difference between the flagrant-violator cases and Kaiser Steel's situ-
ation because the legal system needs to deal with the persistent law
27. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
28. See, e.g., Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (high degree of
risk involved in piloting a commercial jet justified lighter burden on employer to show his employ-
ment criteria were job related).
29. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisley, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Wood Lath-
ers, Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), modified en banc, 452 F.2d at 327.
The first judicial attempts at quota remedies were the school desegregation cases. See, e.g., Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). The complexities and in-
consistencies of the school cases are such that one can safely find support for affirmative action and
for all sorts of limitations on that action. While many of the considerations are different, most of the
pros and cons set out in the text have some impact in the school cases.
30. Some might argue that the quota-remedies cases are distinguishable from the Griggs type
cases because in the quota-remedy cases the employer had proven to be an incorrigible violator of the
law, and something had to be done. Moreover, these same persons might say that courts have consid-
erably greater freedom in granting remedies than they do in finding violations. For the reasons set out
in the text, I am less persuaded by these arguments.
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breaker, the quota-remedies do not accomplish a proper goal very effec-
tively. To the extent we are concerned with having an integrated work
force, the court orders make sense. That is straight affirmative action,
however, regardless of prior violations of the law. To the extent the
courts wish to punish wrongdoers or force employers to behave in the
future, the quota-remedy is a crude method for policing the employers'
employment practices, a crude method which has the problems to which I
have already alluded. To the extent that the quota-remedy is meant either
to undo the employers' earlier acts or to deter other employers in the fu-
ture, it seems to me the remedy is misplaced. A better remedy would be
to compel employers to pay both the black and white employees who are
already involved; to wit, force the employer to pay twice. This remedy
would protect both the white and black employees from suffering and
would place the burden where it belongs-on the wrongdoing employers.
Unfortunately and inexplicably the law generally has not imposed that
burden on the employers.
It is plain, then, that at the time the court dealt with Brian Weber's
complaint, there was precedent under Title VII for governmentally im-
posed affirmative action. In the absence of any other precedent, it might
have been an easy matter to conclude that voluntary affirmative action,
the work of private ordering, 3' was unobjectionable. There were, how-
ever, two obstacles. First, insofar as one were to rely on quota-remedy
court decisions, the language of section 703 makes at least a plausible
case for Justice Rehnquist. 32 That is, section 703's tabu may apply to
private action, but not necessarily to statutory remedies. Moreover, the
judicial decisions authorizing affirmative action remedies had not been
approved by the Supreme Court.
Second, and much more complicating, there was counter-precedent.
Two cases were most significant, although the justices spoke of only one,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 33 The other apparently
relevant case was University of California Regents v. Bakke. 34 In Mc-
Donald, two white individuals complained that they had been discharged
for dishonesty while a fellow black employee had not been, although he
had done what the plaintiffs had done. The district court dismissed the
complaint; the court of appeals affirmed. On the basis of the complaint's
allegations, the Supreme Court held the plaintiffs had stated a claim upon
31. The "private ordering" was a response, at least in part, to threats of loss of government
contracts.
32. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(2)(j)(1976).
33. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
34. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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which relief could be granted. The Court said that whites Were protected
by Title VII. In Weber, Justice Rehnquist was of the view that McDonald
controlled. However, the procedural status of McDonald was such that
the only matter upon which the Court ruled was the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs' pleading; the Court was merely holding that it was conceivable
the plaintiffs might win. In Weber, the majority did not approve all affir-
mative action; there were stated limitations. Reconciling the cases, then,
is not difficult. On the one hand, for example, if Kaiser had fired all its
white employees and embarked on a "black only" employment policy,
the Court's opinion suggests the employer would have violated the law,
especially if the employer's motive was not to undo racial imbalance.
McDonald also suggests that result. On the other hand, if Santa Fe had
determined to tolerate some dishonesty among its black employees in or-
der to avoid exacerbating an already unbalanced work force, it is not clear
to one reading the McDonald opinion that the company violated the law.
If Griggs can impose on employers a little illiteracy, or Dothard v. Raw-
linson35 can impose on employers more costly although, probably, more
accurate methods of assuring sufficiently strong employees, perhaps an
employer voluntarily can accept the greater costs of a little dishonesty in
the work force. 36
Another analysis which may reconcile McDonald and Weber is the
presence or absence of the employer's motive to undo racial imbalance
through affirmative action. The motive of undoing earlier discrimination
was an important part of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Weber. Absent
an employer explanation, the Court could not assume the same about the
motive in McDonald. One should not be surprised, for example, that, if
an employer refuses to employ whites solely because of hatred for whites
and regardless of an interest in affirmative action, the courts may treat the
employer differently than Kaiser was. Whether there are real differences
between the hypothetical hateful mind and the mind of Kaiser is more
35. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
36. In the recent decision of Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Cal. 1979),
the district court interpreted Weber to require an affirmative action plan if discrimination in favor of
blacks or women is to be permitted. In Harmon, a white individual with a superior paper record was
passed over twice by an employer who first promoted a black and then a woman. The court suggested
that the absence of a preconceived plan made the reverse discrimination intolerable under the law.
It is not clear to me why there must be a "plan." If we hypothesize affirmative action motives on
the part of the employer, it is difficult to believe affirmative action is any more or less served by a
formal plan. The only gain I see in having a plan is that it will be easier for reviewing institutions to
understand and judge the propriety of the affirmative action. Whether the possible absence of a plan
in McDonald rationally reconciles that case with Weber seems doubtful.
Washington Law Review
subtle and difficult for me to handle. Nonetheless, the Weber court be-
lieved the motive was important. 37
The Bakke decision was not relied upon by the justices in Weber. Since
the Bakke decision can be distinguished on a number of grounds, it may
be understandable why the case was ignored. 38 First, much of Bakke's
opinions found their bottoms in the Constitution. Second, to the extent
the case was based on legislation, it was a different statute. 39 Third, the
employer was a governmental institution, and there was question whether
an appropriate governmental body had authorized the affirmative ac-
tion. 40 Fourth, there was no suggestion or colorable claim that the school
had ever discriminated against minorities. Fifth, in Bakke, the affirmative
action replaced, as a standard for admission to medical school, a lifetime
of competition which purported to reward effort and skill. And, sixth,
Bakke involved entrance into the medical profession, an unusually high
skill, high risk profession. In my mind, none of these distinctions are
wholly persuasive. One may even believe some are cynical. In the end, of
course, efforts to reconcile Weber with McDonald and Bakke depend to a
very considerable extent on what Weber subsequently proves to mean (or,
for that matter, what McDonald and Bakke may prove to mean; but they
are other stories).
D. A Note on Legislative History
I should say a word about the legislative history. In my judgment, both
the majority and the dissent missed the mark. The truth is, I believe,
whether or not the members of Congress thought of voluntary affirmative
action, they did not discuss the issue. That being so, it is difficult for me
37. Consistent with this analysis, the Harmon court found a violation of the law because (the
court believed) the employer in that case did not discriminate against the white male employee in
order to help classes of victims of earlier societal discrimination (blacks and women).
38. Since this paper was delivered, the Court has held that it is constitutional for Congress to set
aside for minority contractors ten percent of federal funds for public works projects. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, U.S. , 100 S.Ct. 2758 (1980). Consistent with the analysis presented in
this text to justify affirmative action, the Court held that it was at least reasonable for Congress to
wish to assure support for racial groups victimized by earlier societal discrimination. Not surpris-
ingly, the Court was clear that Congress had the authority to behave reasonably. Moreover, the set-
aside was not absolute; a recipient of public works funds could obtain a waiver of the ten percent
requirement. The Court relied on the flexibility provided by the waiver. While the Fullilove opinion
inched the Court a little further towards unequivocal support of affirmative action, it appears that,
once again, the Court has refused to embrace affirmative action without some apparent restrictions,
limitations, or exceptions.
39. The Bakke opinion relied, in part, on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
40. The result in Fullilove, different from that reached in Bakke, is partially explained by the fact




to understand how either the majority or the dissent found much solace in
the history. Justice Rehnquist stated, on the one hand, that Congress
never thought about the matter; on the other hand, the Justice was con-
vinced the history rejected affirmative action. He relied on congressional
comments which were virtually all addressed to whether Title VII com-
pels balanced work forces, not whether employers can voluntarily attempt
the same balance. 41 In a real sense, Justice Rehnquist's quarrel was with
Griggs, which did compel some affirmative action, and not with the We-
ber majority. In any event, I fail to see how the legislative history can
lead someone to both of Rehnquist's conclusions-that the Congress did
not deal with affirmative action and that the Congress clearly rejected it.
For the majority, Justice Brennan also overstates enormously the
meaning of the legislative history. The truth is, Congress did not discuss
or debate the issue. On a more general level, Justice Brennan may be
closer to the mark. Supporters of Title VII wanted to put blacks in a better
position. The Congressional statements reflected a concern for the
overwhelmingly disproportionate burden that societal discrimination had
placed on black people, and reflected a desire to lighten the burden and to
do away with the disparate impact in the game of life. Nevertheless, the
legislative history is overwhelmingly inconclusive.
IV. THE WEBER LIMITATIONS AND SOME UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
By noting several acceptable aspects of the Kaiser plan, the Weber ma-
jority appeared to imply there were limitations on its general ruling that
voluntary affirmative action was permissible. First, the Kaiser plan's pur-
pose was "designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy" and "to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occu-
pations which have been traditionally closed to them.' '42
Second, the plan did not unnecessarily interfere with the interests of the
41. Justice Rehnquist did identify the only legislative history which purported to address the
issue of voluntary affirmative action. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 249-50 (1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Toward the end of the Senate debate on the House bill, two opponents of Title VII (Senators
Cotton and Curtis) had an exchange in which they purported to interpret the bill to outlaw voluntary
affirmative action. 110 CONG. REc. 13086 (1964). It is not clear they were being anything but sar-
donic. In any event it is also unclear how many others heard the dialogue. It is clear that no one-
proponents or opponents-responded to the very brief exchange. It would be ridiculous, and Justice
Rehnquist does not rely heavily on the exchange, to believe that Congress was bound by a very brief
(and possibly non-serious) exchange of only two persons, both opponents of the bill, made late in the
day, made in the presence of no one knows whom, and never discussed further by anyone. It may be
true that the issue was clear, as Rehnquist argued; but it may also be true either that Congress did not
address the matter or meant for the issue to be resolved, if at all, by the courts.
42. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979).
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white employees. The Kaiser plan did not, for example, require the dis-
charge of white workers in order to employ blacks. Moreover, since half
the beneficiaries of the program were white, the plan did not bar entirely
the advancement of white employees. Third, the plan was to continue
only until the number of blacks in the crafts was proportionate to the num-
ber of blacks in the local labor force. Thus, the plan was a temporary
measure; it was not intended to maintain racial balance, but only to
"eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." 43 The Court did not explain
why it was noting these qualities in the Kaiser plan.
The remainder of this paper will address the meaning and desirability
of the apparent limitations on affirmative action, and what lower courts
have done with Weber's holding and limits. The problems for the lower
courts are complicated by the uncertain substantive meanings of the limi-
tations; by the question as to whether each limitation is conjunctive, dis-
junctive, or merely exemplary; and by what I call the Weber opinion's
fundamental schizophrenia. That schizophrenic quality reflects the fol-
lowing conflict. On the one hand, the Court made clear that it was ad-
dressing the wrongs society has visited on blacks. On the other hand, the
Court suggested that there are limitations which have implicit in them, I
believe, some reservations about whether the Court really meant to ad-
dress frontally societal discrimination. This divided or confused commit-
ment will affect all subsequent issues arising after Weber. Some of these
unanswered questions follow. Must there be an affirmative action plan in
order to protect discrimination in favor of minorities? Must the plan be
"voluntary"? What is "voluntary"? Must the objective be to undo the
ravages of prior discrimination? By this employer? Its industry? By all of
society? Must the plan be temporary? What is meant by "temporary"?
Can whites ever be excluded from the plan? Will Weber prove to be a
decision limited to training programs? Must the plan be newly conceived
and thereby not infringe on others' rights, like preexisting seniority
rights? Despite the Court's rhetoric, will it permit affirmative action plans
in cases with less suspicious incriminating facts than existed at Kaiser?
Will the Court permit such plans when the jobs more clearly involve
safety? Or if the jobs more clearly involve educational credentials? In the
past several months, some of these questions have been addressed.
A. Proportionality
Will an employer violate the Act if it engages in affirmative action to
an extent beyond proportionality? If Weber's bottom is societal discrimi-
43. Id. at 209.
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nation, then an employer should be permitted to employ affirmatively
more than its "fair share" of minorities, at least until the entire society is
integrated. The societal discrimination thesis supports affirmative action
even where the employer and the relevant industry have "enough"
blacks. If societal discrimination is the basis of Weber, then the number
of minorities with the employer or industry ought not to be relevant.
(Moreover, the only necessary time limitation on such an affirmative
plan's life would be the time it would take to integrate all of society.
Perhaps, it is this last observation that dictates some limit to the reach of
the Court's opinion.) 44
In some recent cases, courts have had to ask what sort of background
statistics supported a voluntary affirmative action plan. In most cases, the
courts concluded that the statistics supported a finding of preexisting ar-
guable violation of the Act by the employer. Indeed, in some, the em-
ployer had already admitted that there had been violations in the past.45 In
those cases, it is no surprise that the courts have found, afortiori in light
of Weber, that the affirmative action plans were lawful. One court stated
that although it was true there was no underemployment of minorities in
the relevant industry (plant security) there were disparate statistics for a
particular employer group, of which the defendant was a member. 46 That
disparity was sufficient to justify an affirmative action plan. The same
court observed that it was relevant that minorities were victims of dis-
crimination, in general, in that geographical area. Another court ruled
that the existing disparity within an industry (teaching) was sufficient to
justify affirmative acion, despite the fact that there had been no disparate
figures within the work force of the employer who implemented the affir-
mative action program. 47 One court has suggested that no evidence of
prior acts of discrimination is necessary. 48 All of these cases suggest that
the courts may be of a single mind, to wit, that any affirmative action
program is justified because societal discrimination cannot be gainsaid
and, therefore, finding some statistic of discrimination is only a rational-
ization. Another view, however, of these cases, is that the courts have not
44. In fairness to the Court, it should be observed that the following would reconcile somewhat
the apparent inconsistency in Weber. Perhaps the Act compels or permits each and every employer to
do its proportional share, and no more, towards integrating society. This would pressure all employ-
ers to do a better job of integrating their work forces until society was truly integrated.
45. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979)(appeal
pending); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Sacramento County, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161
Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980)(appeal pending); Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh, Pa., 412 A.2d 860 (1980);
Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 480, 599 P.2d 1255 (1979)(appeal pending).
46. Tangren v. Wackenhut Serv., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979).
47. Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia, 484 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
48. Edmondson v. U.S. Steel, 20 FEP Cases (BNA) 1745 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
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yet agreed upon the standard by which to measure the legitimacy of set-
ting up an affirmative action plan. It would not be surprising if the courts
are confused, given the fundamental contradiction in the Supreme Court's
opinion.
B. Time Limitations
The Weber court pointed out that the Kaiser plan was temporary. Why?
The Court did not say. Was the Court suggesting that there must be tem-
poral cutoffs for such plans? One subsequent decision reflects lack of con-
cern for a time cutoff, even in a situation where the employer's work
force is already balanced but the relevant industry's is not. 49 If there must
be a cutoff, when should it be? When the employer's work force is bal-
anced? That is the time Kaiser proposed for cutting off its plan. How
about at the time the industry, rather than the employer, no longer has an
imbalance? As just mentioned, at least one court, Cohen v. Community
College of Philadephia,50 has implied that such a plan would be all right.
Since the Supreme Court eschewed the "arguable violation" route, 51 I
find it difficult to believe that the temporary quality of such plans must
necessarily be tied to the individual employer's getting a proper balance.
Cohen must be correct. On the other hand, so long as there is any imbal-
ance in society, the Court's primary logic would permit any employer to
have an affirmative action plan. The Court's limitation suggests some-
thing less grand. In-between stances, which the Court may yet adopt,
would permit a plan to remain in effect so long as the involved employer,
the industry of which it is a part, or the employer's geographical area has
an arguably inappropriate disparity in the number of oppressed minorities
in the work force.
C. Harm to White Employees
In another small group of cases, courts have had to concern themselves
with the effects plans have on white employees. This is another Weber
limitation which I find confusing. After all, whatever program is adopted,
presumably the last affirmative act of employment will result in an other-
wise more qualified white being denied a job. The rejected applicant's
interest in challenging the system does not vary with the presence or ab-
sence of whites in the program. There is no question that the rejected
white has been denied employment because of race. If an affirmative ac-
49. See Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia, 484 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
50. Id.
51. See note 8 supra.
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tion program is justified because there are societal reasons for discrimi-
nating against whites, it matters not that only some or no whites get the
benefits of the program. Indeed, to the extent there is positive value in the
affirmative action plan, the more blacks-and the fewer whites-hired,
the more effective the program.
The impact on white employees need not be only in situations involv-
ing.original employment. In Weber, it involved eligibility for an appren-
ticeship program. In other cases, the matter may involve promotions, or
layoffs. What interests do whites have? Whatever they are, as I have al-
ready suggested, they are inconsistent with the objectives of affirmative
action. Moreover, I do not believe we can rationally delineate between
those white interests we will protect in the face of affirmative action and
those white interests we will not protect. For example, there were skilled
non-employees who could no longer obtain jobs at Kaiser because of the
company's affirmative action training program. These whites were not
given jobs because of 'their race. Why should there be a distinction be-
tween refusing to employ whites for racial reasons (Weber allows the re-
fusal) and discharging whites for the same reasons? (Weber may not al-
low such discharges.) While I fully understand the possible different
psychological impacts on incumbent whites and on the applicant whites,
the logic of it all is not so clear or obvious that explanation is not needed.
Moreover, as I have already suggested, why should it matter whether
some or no whites are eligible for new jobs, promotions, or whatever, in
the face of the affirmative action plan? Each unsuccessful white will suf-
fer equally. Is the Court addressing only political realities, is it recogniz-
ing society will not like very much plans that employ blacks only?
In any event, it is not surprising that a few courts since Weber have had
to wrestle with the rights of whites. In one case, the decision in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States52 was put under siege
by a questionable reading of Weber. In Tangren v. Wackenhut Services,
Inc. ,53 in the face of governmental pressure (threats of lost government
contracts) to keep more minorities on the job, the company forced the
union to accept an amendment to the collective bargaining contract's se-
niority provisions, so that recently employed minorities would be retained
and more senior whites laid off, when economics necessitated putting
some employees out of work. The Tangren court upheld the seniority
override. Governmental pressures (albeit, not court pressures) forced a
company and a union to abandon a bona fide seniority ladder, despite the
mandate of Title VII and the Teamsters case that such seniority ladders
52. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
53. Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979).
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were immune from attack under the statute. The Tangren court blithely
asserted that the plan was "voluntary," presumably because there was no
court order. The threat of lost government contracts (not wholly unlike
the Weber situation) did not dilute the voluntariness of the action, saith
the court. It may be, then, that due to Weber and governmental action
short of court orders, the Teamsters doctrine will be substantially undone
and seniority ladders will be remade to accomplish the "proper balance"
that was not attainable through litigation.
I have another difficulty with the decision in Tangren, where senior
whites lost their jobs to junior blacks; that is, the limitations in Weber
may suggest a different result. First, the Supreme Court was impressed
that the Kaiser plan did not require "the discharge of white workers and
their replacement with new black hirees. Cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Trans. CO." 54 It is true that in Tangren the employer did not hire new
blacks to replace the whites. Nevertheless, it appears the Supreme Court
in Weber was impressed that whites were not losing their already attained
jobs to blacks in the name of affirmative action. The "Cf." citation to
McDonald at least implies the Court had more in mind than being uncom-
fortable only with the employment of newly hired blacks to replace old
incumbent whites. Second, the Supreme Court was also impressed that
Kaiser's plan was to eliminate racial imbalance, not to retain racial bal-
ance. I am not sure what that distinction means in the face of societal
discrimination; nonetheless, the facts and the court's reasoning in Tan-
gren in part reflect a desire on the part of the employer and the court to
maintain racial balance within that employer, even after the employer had
reached the appropriate ratio of blacks and whites.
V. CONCLUSION
All of what I think Weber means may not add up to much logic. Quite
obviously, the majority opinion is a compromise between the general ap-
proval of affirmative action and its objectives, on the one hand, and a
concern for some of the consequences of unfettered, indefinite affirmative
action, on the other. The opinion also reflects the uncertainty which integ-
rity may require of any conclusions about affirmative action. In my judg-
ment, logic will never resolve the conflicting norms. The reasons which
support affirmative action plans cannot be reconciled with the reasons that
dictate the weaknesses of such plans. Griggs and Bakke, also, were com-
promises, of sorts, not reconciliations. 55 The Griggs Court disguised its
54. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).




affirmative action objectives in rhetoric about unnecessary barriers,
thereby authorizing appropriate barriers to integration (so-called "busi-
ness necessity"). In Bakke, the Court could not even reach an apparent
compromise. In Weber, the Court did give affirmative action open, but
qualified, approval. One should take note, again, that-in the end-both
the facts and rhetoric of Weber are quite narrow. The plan was reasonably
voluntary, it involved an apprenticeship (not the skilled jobs themselves),
it did not override established seniority rights or other preexisting identifi-
able rights, it was to end when the skilled workers at Kaiser were propor-
tionately black, it involved blue collar jobs which-so far as the records
show-were not high risk jobs, the employer had a disproportionately
low number of blacks in the skilled jobs, blacks had been disproportion-
ately (and intentionally) excluded historically from those positions on a
national scale, no whites could be identified as certain individual "vic-
tims" of the plan, and the plaintiff in the case was not placed in a worse
employment posture than he would have been if there had been no plan. 56
Which of these factors will prove, in the future, to be important in the
analysis to legitimize an affirmative action plan is not clear. It is clear,
however, that there will be considerable litigation over the years while the
Court continues to accommodate, probably more politically than logi-
cally, the competing interests, until the true meaning of Weber is known.
56. One should note that the facts in Weber made the questions in the case significantly easier
than they might otherwise have been. Brian Weber had been an employee of Kaiser for a period of
time prior to the company's and union's decision to initiate the affirmative action program. He did
not, however, have the skills to be a craft employee, the job category for which the special training
program was created. It is clear then that if the program, which was created solely for the purpose of
increasing the number of black employees qualified for craft work, had never come into being, Weber
would never have applied for the program.Moreover, since it is certain he did not have the skills to be
a craftsman, there can be no question that the affirmative action program did not work to his disad-
vantage. To the contrary, the program worked to his advantage. He had at least a new opportunity for
craft work training, although it was not fulfilled in the first year of the plan.
In light of these facts, it is arguable that Weber had no real interest to justify a challenge to the
program. Unlike Alan Bakke in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), about whom it would never be clear whether he would have been admitted to medical school
if there had been no affirmative action in admissions at the Davis Medical School, we are virtually
certain that at the time of litigation, Brian Weber would never have been employed as a skilled
craftsman, whether or not there was an affirmative action training program. The only persons who
were financially injured by the program were those people who normally would have been hired to do
the work if there had been no special craft work training. Although the Court did not mention this
fact, one cannot discount its potential importance in reading the Weber decision. While Weber almost
surely had standing to challenge the allegedly discriminatory plan because the program did make job
opportunities available on racial grounds to the exclusion of Weber, it is possible that the outcome
may reflect the Court's conviction that Weber and those other white employees in his situation suf-
fered no injury.
